V zadnjem letu in pol smo priča novim krčem in presenečenjem, povezanimi s postopki odločanja in vodenja skupnega. Zaradi značilnosti trenutne oblasti so ti krči potencirani, niso pa novi. Medtem, ko ustava določa, da ima v Sloveniji oblast ljudstvo, državljanke in državljani pa jo izvršujejo neposredno in z volitvami, je že tako šibka neposredna demokracija utrpela številne nove omejitve. Medtem ko delovanje predstavniške demokracije ni bilo v nobeni točki (samo)omejeno, so bili protesti kot temeljni izraz neposredne demokracije več kot 5 mesecev popolnoma prepovedani, udeleženci oglobljeni z visokimi denarnimi kaznimi, referendum o vlaganjih 780 milijonov evrov v vojsko prepovedan, pobudniki referenduma o zakonu o vodi so morali preskočiti številne ovire že ob zbiranju podpisov za razpis, padec zakona na referendumu pa ni imel bistvenega vpliva na delovanje oblasti. Delni korektor koncentracije, nenadzorovanosti in neodgovornosti delovanja zlasti izvršilne, delno pa tudi zakonodajne veje oblasti je Ustavno sodišče, čigar odločitve pa se v praksi ne upoštevajo. Ko se na zlorabe oblasti odzove civilna družba, je preslišana, ker nosilci oblasti na očitke ne odgovarjajo vsebinsko, ampak z delegitimacijo njenega obstoja: “Kdor ni bil izvoljen na volitvah, naj molči.”

Smo zgolj v izjemnih časih, ko trenutna oblast “najboljšega možnega od vseh svetov” maliči do nerazpoznavnosti ali pa živimo zgolj v še eni etapi navidezne demokracije, ki se ohranja z represijo, grožnjami in kaznovanjem, ljudem pa so, v igro soodločanja vpoklicani z rezervne klopi enkrat na štiri leta, zadnje pribežališče le še njihovo telo in upor maskam, testiranju in cepljenju?

Crisis of parliamentary democracy

In the last year and a half, we have witnessed new crunches and surprises related to decision-making and managing the commons. Due to the characteristics of the current government, these crunches are potentiated, however, they are nothing new. While the Constitution stipulates that in Slovenia, who has the power are the people, and that citizens exercise their power directly and through elections, the already feeble direct democracy has suffered many new restrictions. While the functioning of representative democracy was not (self) restricted at any point, protests as a fundamental expression of direct democracy were completely banned for more than 5 months, participants were fined heavily, a referendum on investing 780 million euros in the army was banned, and the initiators of a referendum on the Water Law had to overcome many obstacles already at the stage of collecting signatures for the tender, and the outcome of the referendum did not have a significant impact on the functioning of the government. The Constitutional Court acts as a partial corrective of the concentration, uncontrollability and irresponsibility of the workings of especially the executive, and partly also of the legislative branch. However, the decisions of The Constitutional Court are not taken into account in practice. When civil society responds to the abuses of power, it is ignored because the authorities do not respond to the allegations in terms of content, but by delegitimizing the existence of civil society: “Whoever was not elected in the elections, let him be silent.”

Are we only in exceptional times, in which the current government is deforming the “best of all worlds”? Or do we live in just another stage of a virtual democracy maintained by repression, threats and punishment, where people are called to the game of co-decision once every four years? When people’s last refuge are only their body and resistance to masks, testing and vaccination?